Permission service:
- Add hasAccess() with explicit minLevel param, deprecate canAccess()
- Cycle protection + depth limit (50) on all parent traversal
- Pick highest access level across multiple roles (was using first match)
- isPublic only grants view on directly requested folder, not inherited
- Sanitize file extension from content-type
- Clean up orphaned traverse perms when removing permissions
- Add getPermissionById() for authz checks on permission deletion
Storage routes:
- All write ops require edit via hasAccess() — traverse can no longer
create folders, upload files, rename, toggle isPublic, or delete
- Permission delete requires admin access on the folder
- Permission list requires admin access on the folder
- Folder children listing filtered by user access
- File search results filtered by user access (was returning all)
- Signed URL requires view (was using canAccess which allows traverse)
WebDAV:
- 100MB upload size limit (was unbounded — OOM risk)
- PROPFIND root filters folders by user access (was listing all)
- COPY uses hasAccess('view') not canAccess (traverse bypass)
- All writes use hasAccess('edit') consistently
- MKCOL at root requires files.delete permission
- Lock ownership enforced on UNLOCK (was allowing any user)
- Lock conflict check on LOCK (423 if locked by another user)
- Lock enforcement on PUT and DELETE (423 if locked by another)
- Max 100 locks per user, periodic expired lock cleanup
- Path traversal protection: reject .. and null bytes in segments
- Brute-force protection: 10 failed attempts per IP, 5min lockout
